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Abstract
We analyse decision-making in the presence of Freedom of In-
formation (FOI) rules. A decision-maker chooses whether to ac-
quire costly information to inform his decision regarding a policy
action. If information is not disclosed voluntarily a monitor may
open a costly investigation, using FOI to access the information. A
finding of biased decision-making or negligence in information ac-
quisition generates a reward to the monitor and a penalty to the
decision-maker. We find that strengthening FOI to reduce the cost
of investigation may increase negligence without necessarily reduc-
ing bias. Moreover increasing the reward for discovering negligence
can paradoxically increase negligence in equilibrium.
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Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation establishes the principle that
citizens, including journalists and interested parties, should be able to ac-
cess any document held by a public body. Its goal is to discipline offi cials
to act in the public interest rather than following their private desires or
pandering to favoured groups. The first FOI law was the Swedish Freedom
of the Press Act of 1766. Two hundred years later the United States passed
its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Currently, over one hundred coun-
tries around the world have adopted FOI regimes (McIntosh, 2014).
FOI legislation continues to evolve and its principles occasionally come
under threat. The U.S. FOIA Improvement Act of 2016 limits the exemp-
tions that government agencies can invoke to deny access to documents and
establishes a ‘presumption of openness’(The Washington Post, 2016). In
the U.K., the Independent Commission on Freedom of Information, set up
in July 2015 to examine concerns that the Freedom of Information Act 2000
inhibits the workings of government, reported in March 2016 that ‘there is
no evidence that the Act needs to be radically altered, or that the right
of access to information needs to be restricted’(see Cabinet Offi ce, 2016;
also Allen and Pickard, 2016 and Quinn, 2016). Given the recent interest
in FOI, the impact of such measures is a timely and important topic for
consideration.
Our paper highlights the impact of FOI (and other, e.g. court-based,
disclosure processes) on the incentive for public decision-makers to acquire
relevant information prior to taking decisions as required to weigh up the
options as accurately as possible. When information that is gathered might
later be subject to a FOI request, with adverse revelations having detri-
mental consequences for the decision-maker, there may be a ‘chilling’effect
on information acquisition. The paper also investigates institutional de-
sign of FOI to achieve desirable discipline effect on decision-making while
minimising detrimental impacts on information acquisition.
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We present a model in which a decision-maker makes a binary choice
of action a ∈ {0, 1}. The resulting social benefit depends on the state of
the world, which is unknown at the start of the game, while the decision-
maker also receives a private benefit from a = 1 which biases his choice.
Prior to choosing, the decision-maker may acquire information revealing
the state of the world; this may be interpreted broadly to include not just
data collection but also analysis, which similarly requires time and effort.
As a benchmark, we start by considering the privately optimal behav-
iour of a decision-maker in the absence of FOI, on the assumption that
scrutiny is prohibitively expensive in its absence. The private benefit from
a = 1 reduces social welfare in two distinct ways. First, when information
is acquired the probability of taking the socially inferior action (an occur-
rence we refer to as bias) is increasing in the private benefit. Secondly, the
probability of not acquiring information (an outcome we term negligence)
is increasing in the private benefit: by reducing the impact of the state of
the world on the decision-maker’s choice, a larger private benefit lowers the
private value of information.
In the main model we introduce a monitor who may use FOI to access
the decision-maker’s information. Now, an informed decision-maker may
choose to disclose his information at the same time as choosing the action.
The monitor observes the action but, unless this is voluntarily revealed,
she does not observe the information (if acquired), nor the fact of its ac-
quisition. In the absence of voluntary disclosure the monitor may, at some
cost, open an investigation in which she uses FOI to access the information
held by the decision-maker.1 We assume that information is ‘hard’in the
1The scope of FOI regimes is typically very wide, providing access to recorded infor-
mation in all forms and covering both raw data and analysis of the data.
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sense that it cannot be hidden or distorted.2 If voluntary disclosure or an
investigation show the decision-maker to be biased he incurs a punishment;
a (weakly smaller) punishment is incurred if investigation reveals that he
was negligent. Following an investigation the monitor receives a reward if
she discovers bias and a (weakly smaller) reward if she uncovers negligence.
We find that the introduction of FOI has several effects on the inef-
ficiencies identified in the benchmark. As one might expect, the threat
of investigation and punishment has a positive discipline effect which con-
sists of a reduction in bias, inducing the decision-maker to take the socially
optimal action more frequently. The impact of FOI on information acqui-
sition is more complex, however: if the punishment for negligence is small,
FOI has a chilling effect which consistes of an aggravation of negligence. By
disciplining his action choice and punishing bias, the threat of investigation
reduces the decision-maker’s payoff from being informed, thus decreasing
his incentive to acquire information in the first place. Strengthening FOI to
reduce the cost of an investigation, if carried out in isolation, may increase
negligence without necessarily reducing bias; paradoxically, bias may even
be increased.
We identify the first best institutional design, assuming that the legisla-
tor can control not only the investigation cost but also all of the punishment
and reward parameters. We then explore the second best outcomes that
may be achieved when a legislator can affect only a few of the parameters.
We find that the effectiveness of FOI depends critically on the magnitudes
of the punishment for negligence and the reward for uncovering this, rel-
ative to those for bias. Increasing this punishment towards its first best
2Failing to record information or retaining it in a form that side-steps FOI requests
may be forbidden by law: for example the U.S. Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976
requires government agencies to keep transcripts of ‘meetings’, defined to include dis-
cussions that effectively predetermine offi cial actions. Secondly, attempts to circumvent
FOI are likely to degrade the quality of information and undermine its use in decision-
making: see Pickard and Stacey (2015) regarding the automatic deletion of emails sent
from the U.K. Prime Minister’s offi ce, apparently in response to the introduction of FOI.
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level is always beneficial in reducing negligence. By contrast, when the
punishment for negligence is small raising the reward for discovering it
can aggravate negligence with no offsetting reduction in bias. A modest
increase in the punishment for bias may also worsen negligence.
The paper provides insights into many real-world situations. We de-
scribe three specific applications– the media and political accountability,
discovery in court proceedings and product safety approval– interpreting
the players and parameters in each case and drawing out implications for
policy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 discusses related literature.
Section 2 describes the model and benchmark results. Equilibrium analysis
is given in Section 3. Section 4 presents the first best solution and second
best institutional design. Section 5 discusses the three applications. Section
6 concludes. An appendix presents the full characterisation of equilibrium
and its proof.
1 Related literature
The paper is related to several strands of literature. One is the litera-
ture on costs and benefits of transparency in the political process based
on principal-agent theory. In a situation of moral hazard with complete
contracting, Holmström (1979) demonstrates that the principal is never
harmed by (and generally gains from) observing additional information
about the agent’s performance. In the absence of complete contracts, how-
ever, ineffi ciencies can arise, as shown by e.g. Maskin and Tirole (2004).
A number of papers consider the impact of transparency using models
of career concerns. In Prat (2005) an agent may ignore his private signal,
even if this means taking the inferior action, because the principal makes
an inference about his ability from the action choice itself. Because of
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this ineffi ciency the principal’s expected payoff may be higher when the
action is concealed and only its consequence is observed. Based on this
result Prat makes the policy recommendation that actions should not be
revealed, a principle seen in several FOI regimes which allow short-term
secrecy while the decision process is ongoing. The ineffi ciency in Prat’s
paper can be compared to those in ours as follows: in his model the signal
is obtained automatically but may be ignored in equilibrium, whereas in
ours information may not be acquired at all (negligence) or, when acquired,
may be ignored for some realisations (bias). Hoppe (2013) sets out an
adverse selection model where the agent can gather private information
before the principal offers the contract and finds that the principal may
be better off when information gathering is hidden. Levy (2007) considers
decision-making in committees, analyzing the impact of transparency when
committee members are motivated by career concerns.
Since the decision-maker in our model has the option of voluntarily
disclosing his information, our analysis is also related to the literature on
persuasion. On this literature see Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) and, more recently, Mathis (2008), Che and Kartik (2009), Rayo
and Segal (2010), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011, 2016), Felgenhauer and
Loerke (2017), Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) and Hagenbach, Koessler
and Perez-Richet (2014); see also Milgrom (2008) for a survey. In common
with papers on persuasion, and in contrast with ‘cheap talk’, in our analysis
information is taken to be ‘hard’and cannot be distorted. However, our
paper differs from the persuasion literature in two respects. First, infor-
mation has a private value to the sender (here, the decision-maker), who
himself takes an action, distinct from its value in communication with the
receiver (here, the monitor). Secondly, the receiver faces a cost of ‘punish-
ing’a sender who does not disclose information (investigation is costly). As
a result, the unravelling argument that typically guarantees full disclosure
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of information in persuasion games does not apply to our model.
The characteristics of FOI legislation internationally are described by
Frankel (2001). FOI’s effects on U.K. government are discussed by Hazell
and Glover (2011), Hazell, Bourke and Worthy (2012) and Worthy and
Hazell (2013). The impact of transparency on the decision-making process
is studied in a number of empirical papers, drawing on the natural exper-
iment provided by the release of transcripts of the Federal Open Market
Committee in 1993: see Meade and Stasavage (2008) and Hansen, McMa-
hon and Prat (2017). Both papers find that transparency reduces dissent
from the Chairman’s policy proposal, increasing the conformity of opinions,
while Hansen et al. also find evidence of greater information acquisition
between meetings by inexperienced members of the committee.
2 The model
2.1 Information acquisition without monitoring
As a benchmark, we start by considering information acquisition by a
decision-maker in the absence of monitoring. A decision-maker, D, chooses
an action a ∈ {0, 1}. The social payoff from his choice depends on the state
of the world θ, whose realisation is initially unknown to all parties. The
distribution of θ is commonly known to be θ ∼ U [0, 1]. Social welfare from
action a is given byW (a, θ) = − |a− θ|. The socially optimal decision rule
α∗ (θ) is therefore
α∗ (θ) =

1 if θ > 1
2
0 if θ < 1
2





If the realisation of θ is unknown the optimal action is assessed according to
the prior distribution; society is then indifferent between a = 1 and a = 0.
Although D takes social welfare into account, he also receives a private
benefit b from a = 1. D’s payoff is given by U (a, θ, b) = ab− |a− θ|, where
b ∈ (0, 1]. Before choosing a, D can learn the realisation of θ at a cost
k > 0.3 We will refer to θ as the ‘type’of an informed decision-maker. To
summarise, the timeline is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state of the world θ; this is unobservable.
2. D chooses whether or not to pay k to learn the realisation of θ.
3. D chooses action a ∈ {0, 1}; payoffs are realised.
If informed, D makes his decision conditionally on θ, using decision
rule α (θ). D optimally chooses action 1 if and only if θ weakly exceeds
the privately optimal type threshold θ0 ≡ 1−b2 ; in case of indifference, the
decision-maker chooses a = 1. As illustrated in Figure 1, θ0 is less than
one-half, the socially optimal action threshold. Due to the private benefit






over which he chooses a = 1 despite this
being the socially inferior choice. The larger is b, the greater this interval.
Notice that the private benefit operates in one direction only, thus there is
no corresponding interval in which D chooses a = 0 when a = 1 is socially
optimal: α (θ) = α∗ (θ) for θ ≥ 1
2
. The ineffi ciency whereby D is informed
but fails to implement the socially optimal decision rule is termed bias.
Fig. 1: Privately optimal decision rule
3We assume that information acquisition perfectly reveals the state of the world and
study the impact of FOI on the probability that information is acquired. Alternatively,
one could assume that information consists of an imperfect signal of the state and that
the accuracy of the signal increases with expenditure, and study the impact of FOI on
the precision of the information acquired.
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If uninformed, D maximises his expected utility given the prior. Given
b, he therefore chooses a = 1. Notice that since θ0 > 0, the interval over
which the socially inferior action is chosen is greater when the decision-
maker is not informed than when he is. Put another way, the uninformed
decision-maker’s action choice is equivalent to the limiting case of bias
where b→ 1.
Given the privately optimal action choice, the value of information to D,
i.e. the difference between his expected utility when he acquires information






[b− (1− θ)] dθ −
∫ 1
0




k0 represents the value of hidden information: this is the maximum D is
willing to pay to acquire information when both the acquisition of informa-
tion and its content cannot be investigated by a third party. In the absence
of monitoring information acquisition is optimal for D if and only if k ≤ k0.
When acquired, information is used following the privately optimal action
threshold θ0. Notice that greater b reduces the value of hidden information,
as information about θ makes less difference to D’s action choice. In the
limit where b = 1, D acts regardless of the realisation of θ and k0 = 0.
Next we determine the socially optimal information acquisition rule.
The social value of information compares expected welfare when D acquires
information and follows the socially optimal decision rule with expected












− (1− θ) dθ = 1
4
≡ k∗∗.
In the first best, information is acquired iff its cost does not exceed k∗∗.
For strictly positive b, k∗∗ > k0: the social value of information exceeds its
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private value and D underinvests in information, an ineffi ciency we term
negligence. This is set out in Proposition 1 and illustrated in Figure 2.
Proposition 1 (Information acquisition without monitoring)
In the absence of monitoring, greater private benefit reduces the decision-
maker’s incentive to acquire information. Compared with the social opti-
mum, the decision-maker underinvests in information.
Fig. 2: Privately optimal information acquisition and decision rule
2.2 Information acquisition with monitoring
We now introduce a monitor, M. She does not observe whether D acquires
information but observes D’s action a. D’s private benefit b and information
cost k are common knowledge. After observing a M may, at a cost c > 0,
open an investigation, invoking FOI to compel D to reveal his information.
If D has acquired information then investigation reveals the realisation
of θ. If this shows that D acted contrary to the socially optimal decision
rule (1), i.e. the observed a is different from α∗ (θ), then a punishment for
bias p ∈ (0, b) is imposed on D while M receives a reward r ≥ c; we denote
c/r ≡ C ≤ 1. Both p and r are assumed to be fixed amounts.4 With p < b
bias can be deterred only partially; while p > b may be relevant for some
4The main results also hold in a richer model in which the punishment and reward
for bias are proportional to the impact of the biased decision on social welfare.
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applications, allowing for this would greatly increase the complexity of the
analysis while leaving unchanged the qualitative conclusions that the in-
troduction of FOI worsens information acquisition and that, depending on
the value of k, lowering C may reduce information acquisition. If investiga-
tion instead reveals that D has not acquired information, then M remains
uninformed about θ; a punishment for negligence zp is then imposed on D
while M receives a reward xr. We assume that x, z ∈ (0, 1): negligence is
considered a lesser offence, and carries a lower reward, than bias.
If informed, D may pre-empt an investigation by voluntarily disclosing
θ at the same time as choosing a. We represent this as D choosing v (θ) ∈
{0, 1} where v = 0 is no disclosure and v = 1 is voluntary disclosure.
Information is assumed to be ‘hard’, i.e. θ cannot be misreported. If
disclosure reveals that D acted contrary to the socially optimal decision
rule (1) he still suffers the punishment for bias p. We assume that D
suffers a small nuisance cost ε of undergoing an investigation, which may
be interpreted as the inconvenience of responding to M’s request, even if he
is cleared of wrongdoing.5 Given ε an informed D may prefer to reveal his
information rather than risk investigation. We assume ε to be negligible
and generally omit it from the calculations, but it appears in proofs and
discussions whenever it breaks an indifference tie.
To summarise, the following game is played by D and M:
1. Nature chooses the state of the world θ; this is unobservable.
2. D chooses to acquire information with probability γ ∈ [0, 1], paying k
to learn the realisation of θ; this choice is unobserved by M.
3. D chooses an observable action a ∈ {0, 1}; if informed, D also chooses
5While information disclosure might itself be regarded as costly, responding to a FOI
request is likely to be more so as this imposes a short deadline for response, under
threat of fines, which is likely to increase costs compared with voluntary disclosure (e.g.
by taking staff away from normal duties at short notice). Court-based processes are
particularly onerous in terms of staff time and may also require external lawyers and
advisers to be hired.
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whether or not to disclose his information voluntarily, v ∈ {0, 1}.
4. If information has not been disclosed, M chooses whether or not to pay
c to open an investigation; payoffs are realised.
The equilibrium concept used throughout the paper is perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE). We denote by π the probability that M investigates
after observing action a = 0 and by π the probability that she investigates
after observing a = 1. Normalising to zero M’s payoff if she does not open
an investigation,6 her payoffUM from investigating after observing action a
is equal to xr−c if D is uninformed and r |a− α∗ (θ)|−c if D is informed and
the state of the world is θ. We assume M is suffi ciently sophisticated that,
if information is not disclosed, she can infer from D’s equilibrium strategy
a posterior on θ, but that in order to generate rewards and punishments
she nonetheless needs to investigate to obtain evidence. Therefore, M can
use her inference only in deciding whether or not to investigate.7
3 Equilibrium
The full characterisation of equilibrium in the monitoring game is given in
Proposition 5, which is presented in the Appendix together with a formal
proof. This section gives an intuitive discussion of the main features of
the equilibrium outcomes and analyses the impact of introducing FOI and
strengthening the rules to reduce the investigation cost.
6Notice that, if taken into account by the monitor (e.g. a judge), social welfare from
the action that has been taken would appear in the payoff from investigating and from
not investigating, thus equating the latter to zero is merely a normalisation.
7Good journalistic practice requires evidence to be obtained before allegations are
reported in a newspaper, as the publisher may be required to defend the article in court.
Court-based mechanisms (such as appeals against regulatory decisions) require evidence
to be presented to the judge, who then makes a decision based only on that evidence.
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3.1 Decision-maker’s action and disclosure choices
For any investigation strategy {π, π} chosen byM, an uninformed D chooses
a = 1 in equilibrium: the punishment for negligence zp is smaller than b,
thus a = 1 is optimal even if this increases the probability of investigation.
When D is informed, his equilibrium disclosure choice depends on the
social optimality of his action and M’s investigation strategy. If he takes
the socially optimal action, hence will not be punished even if M learns his
information, a strictly positive investigation probability causes him volun-
tarily to disclose his information to avoid the nuisance cost ε. When this
probability is zero he is indifferent towards disclosure. When taking the
socially inferior action, however, he will not disclose voluntarily unless M
investigates with probability one, in which case the punishment for bias
will be suffered anyway and disclosure avoids ε.
When informed, D’s equilibrium action choice is α (θ) = 1 if θ is weakly
greater than a given threshold and 0 otherwise. While in the benchmark
without monitoring the threshold is θ0 = 1−b2 , in the presence of monitoring
it is θπ ≡ 1−b+πp2 . Intuitively, θπ = θ0 for π = 0: if D expects no investi-
gation after a = 1 then he follows his privately optimal decision rule. For
π > 0, θπ is to the right of θ0, closer to the social optimum (one-half).
This is the discipline effect : the threat of investigation reduces bias. The
discipline effect is strongest when π = 1; D’s action threshold in this case






. These thresholds are illustrated in Figure
3. Note that, since p < b, even when π = 1 the decision-maker’s private
benefit is only partially disciplined and θ1 lies strictly to the left of one-half.
Fig. 3: Decision rule with monitoring
13
Notice also that the informed D’s decision rule in the presence of monitoring
is independent of π. At any θ for which α (θ) = 0, it is also true that
α∗ (θ) = 0, thus investigation after a = 0 never results in punishment and
π > 0 has no effect.
3.2 Value of information with monitoring
The value of information acquisition to D depends on M’s investigation
strategy. M’s decision to investigate is taken after observing D’s action in
the absence of disclosure. For a = 0 D’s optimal decision rule (illustrated in
Figure 3) guarantees that this is socially optimal, thus M optimally chooses
not investigate: in equilibrium π = 0. On observing a = 1 M chooses π
by comparing the cost of an investigation to its expected reward given her
equilibrium belief that either negligence or bias has occurred.
The value of information to D is found by comparing his payoff from
playing γ = 0 and a best response to π in the subsequent continuation
game with his payoff from playing γ = 1 and a best response to π in the
subsequent continuation game. The former value decreases in π as a higher
probability of investigation increases the expected punishment for negli-
gence. The impact of π on the latter value is more complex: higher π
increases the probability of punishment when taking the socially inferior
action, but at the same time the action threshold moves closer to the so-
cially optimal one through the discipline effect, thus the set of types who
take the socially inferior action is reduced. As shown in the Appendix, the






(b− 2z) π + k0. (2)
It is useful to consider the value of information in the two extreme
cases of π = 0 and π = 1. In Section 2.1 we defined the value of hidden
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information k0 as the value of information in the absence of monitoring.
This quantity can also be interpreted as the value of information kπ when
M chooses π = 0. We now define the value of observed information: this is
the maximum cost D is willing to incur to acquire information when π = 1






(b− 2z) + k0. (3)
Looking at the impact of π on kπ in (2), notice that if z is suffi ciently
large at z > b
2
, kπ is increasing in π for π ∈ [0, 1]. In this case the negative
impact of a higher π on the payoff from being uninformed dominates the
other effects; the minimum value of information is then k0 and its maximum
is k1. If instead z is suffi ciently small, with z <
b−p
2
, kπ decreases in π; then
the minimum value of information is k1 (which may be negative) and its
maximum is k0. Finally, for intermediate values
b−p
2
< z < b
2
the value
of information is decreasing in π for small values of π, reaches a (possibly
negative) minimum kmin ≡ k0− (b−2z)
2
4
at π = b−2z
p
, and increases for larger
values of π.
3.3 Impact of freedom of information
We now present the equilibria of the game and discuss the impact of FOI.
When k exceeds its maximum value max {k0, k1}, identified in Section 3.2,
D does not acquire information for any investigation strategy chosen by
M. The discussion therefore focuses on cases where k is no greater than its
maximum value.
3.3.1 Case 1: Small punishment for negligence
The following proposition (which follows directly from Proposition 5, in
the Appendix) describes the case where the punishment for negligence is




.8 We define a critical threshold of M’s cost-reward ratio, C0 ≡ b1+b .
The equilibria are shown graphically in Figure 4.
Proposition 2 Equilibrium with small punishment for negligence
Assume that z ≤ b−p
2
.
(a) If k ∈ [min{0, k1}, k0] then negligence depends on C as follows:
(i) For C ≤ x there exists an equilibrium with γ = 0.
(ii) For C > x there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium with γ ∈ (0, 1) and
γ increasing in C. If information is acquired, only types θ ≥ 1
2
disclose it
and the action threshold is θπ ∈ (θ0, θ1), independent of C and decreasing
in k.
(iii) For C ≥ C0 there exists an equilibrium with γ = 1, no disclosure, and
action threshold θ0.
(b) If k < k1 and k1 > 0, then γ = 1 for any C. Moreover,
(iv) For any C there exists an equilibrium with full disclosure and action
threshold θ1.
(v) For C ≥ C0 there exists an equilibrium with no disclosure and action
threshold θ0.
8Note that if p > b the RHS of this condition would be negative and this case would
not exist.
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Fig. 4: Equilibria with small punishment for negligence
If the cost of information is in the same range as its value, i.e. k ∈
[min{0, k1}, k0], information acquisition depends on the magnitude of C.
For C ≤ x there exists an equilibrium (i) in which M investigates after
a = 1 with probability one (π = 1); the value of information is then k1,
which is lower than its cost and so D does not acquire it.
For C > x M optimally investigates if and only if she believes with
suffi ciently high probability that D is informed and biased, as the reward
for uncovering negligence is below the cost of investigation. There exists a
mixed strategy equilibrium (ii) in which γ ∈ (0, 1), increasing in C, and M
chooses π ∈ (0, 1), decreasing in k. The intuition is related to well-known
results in inspection games. Fix a pair (C, k) for which this equilibrium
exists and consider a marginal increase in C. To preserve M’s indifference
the expected reward from investigating after a = 1 must also increase. In
equilibrium, a = 1 signals either that D is negligent or that he is informed
and biased. Since x < 1, the second event implies a higher reward for M;
thus, when C increases, γ must also increase to preserve M’s indifference.
17
Similarly, consider a marginal increase in k. To preserve D’s indifference
the value of information must also increase. With suffi ciently small z, kπ
is decreasing in π, hence π must decrease to preserve indifference.
For C ≥ C0 a third type of equilibrium (iii) exists in which D acquires
information, does not disclose it and follows the privately optimal threshold
θ0. If M observes a = 1 she infers from equilibrium beliefs that it might






, in which case investigation






, in which case there would be








which we denote by C0: if C weakly exceeds this probability M does not
investigate. Since there is no investigation, the value of information is k0,
which is greater than its cost, hence D optimally acquires information.
If the cost of information is less than its minimum value, k < k1,9
information acquisition is independent of C and always takes place. For
C ≥ C0 the third equilibrium noted above also exists (cases (iii) and (v)
of the proposition refer to the same equilibrium). In addition, for any C
there exists an equilibrium (iv) in which D always voluntarily discloses his
information when taking a = 1, thus his action is fully disciplined. To
enforce this equilibrium, failure to disclose must prompt an investigation;
for any investigation cost there exists at least one set of off-equilibrium
beliefs guaranteeing that this is indeed optimal for M.10
Impact of FOI. Comparing Figure 4 with the no-monitoring bench-
mark in Figure 2, with small z the introduction of FOI to permit moni-
toring increases negligence (the chilling effect) and may reduce bias (the
discipline effect). In Figure 2 information is always acquired for k < k0,
while in Figure 4 it is acquired for sure only for k < k1 < k0. When infor-
9Notice that this region does not exist if the parameter values are such that k1 < 0.
10The smaller is C, the larger the set of off-equilibrium beliefs for which it is optimal
for the monitor to investigate.
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mation is acquired, in Figure 2 the action threshold is θ0, while in Figure 4
there may be a higher, socially preferable threshold (θ1 or θπ). Bearing in






, the quality of decision-making may improve for k < k1 but may
be worsened for k ∈ [k1, k0] as there are now equilibria in which negligence
occurs.
The impact of strengthening FOI to reduce C depends on the value of
k. For k < k1 information is always acquired; reducing C below C0 may
then be beneficial in reducing bias. But for k ∈ [k1, k0] strengthening FOI is
likely to increase negligence and might also increase bias. Equilibrium (iii),
with full information acquisition, exists only for C > C0. In the mixed
equilibrium (ii) the probability of negligence increases as C is reduced:
at C = x the probability of information acquisition falls to zero. For
suffi ciently low C the only equilibrium is (i), where information is not
acquired. Therefore reducing C is likely to deter information acquisition
partially or entirely. Meanwhile, reducing C can lower bias only if x is
suffi ciently low (Figure 4a) and C is reduced from a value above C0 to a
value in (x,C0). If x is higher (Figure 4b), a reduction in C has either
no effect on bias or, if C is reduced from a value above x to a value in
(C0, x), actually increases it. Thus the quality of decision-making is likely
to worsen.
3.3.2 Case 2: Large punishment for negligence
It might be suggested that information acquisition could be enforced simply
by raising z to punish D more severely for negligence. Proposition 3 (which
follows directly from Proposition 5) describes equilibrium outcomes when
z is large, demonstrating that this approach may not be effective and that,
even in this case, lowering C may increase negligence. The proposition
considers the case where z ≥ b
2
, so that kπ is increasing in π. Figure 5
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illustrates.
Proposition 3 Equilibrium with large punishment for negligence
Assume that z ≥ b
2
.
(a) If k ∈ [k0, k1] then negligence depends on C as follows:
(i) For any C there exists an equilibrium with γ = 1, full disclosure, and
action threshold θ1.
(ii) For C > x there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium with γ ∈ (0, 1) and
γ increasing in C. If information is acquired, only types θ ≥ 1
2
disclose it
and the action threshold is θπ ∈ (θ0, θ1), independent of C and increasing
in k.
(iii) For C ≥ x there exists an equilibrium with γ = 0.
(b) If k < k0 then γ = 1 for any C. Moreover,
(iv) For any C there exists an equilibrium with full disclosure and action
threshold θ1.
(v) For C ≥ C0, there exists an equilibrium with no disclosure and action
threshold θ0.
Fig. 5: Equilibria with large punishment for negligence
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For intermediate k ∈ [k0, k1] information acquisition again depends on
the magnitude of C. Cases (i) and (iv) are analogous to case (iv) of Propo-
sition 2 and case (v) is the same as in that proposition. In case (iii), given
equilibrium beliefs the cost of investigation exceeds its reward so M does
not investigate; the value of information is then k0, which is smaller than
its cost so D does not acquire information. The mixed equilibrium (ii) is
analogous to the mixed equilibrium in Proposition 2 except that now the
probability of investigation, and hence the extent of discipline, is increasing
rather than decreasing in k. As explained above, to preserve D’s indiffer-
ence as k increases, kπ must also increase; since kπ is now increasing in π
this requires π to increase.
Impact of FOI. Comparing Figures 2 and 5, with large z the introduc-
tion of FOI may reduce both negligence and bias. By raising k1 above k0,
large z tends to reduce negligence compared with the no-monitoring bench-
mark, but the multiplicity of equilibria in the region where k ∈ [k0, k1] and
C > x means that, even in this case, negligence may still occur.
Strengthening FOI to reduce C has the following effects. As with low
z, if k is below the minimum value of information (now k0) negligence
never occurs and reducing C may be beneficial in reducing bias. But for
k ∈ [k0, k1] reducing C may increase negligence and does not necessarily
reduce bias. For C > x there are multiple equilibria: if C is reduced but
remains greater than x, negligence increases in the mixed equilibrium and
is unaffected in the other two. Only when C falls below x is negligence
eliminated. Meanwhile, a decrease in C reduces bias only if the mixed
equilibrium is played initially and C is then reduced below x, otherwise bias
is unaffected. Bearing in mind that negligence implies an action threshold
of zero, if C is reduced but remains above x then the quality of decision-
making can only worsen, while reducing C below x may improve it.
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To simplify the exposition Propositions 2 and 3 focus on the cases where
z ≤ b−p
2
and z ≥ b
2
respectively. For completeness we present in Figure 6








mixed equilibria from Propositions 2 and 3 now co-exist with overlapping
existence regions: the former exists for k ∈ (kmin, k0) and the latter exists




















Section 2.1 identified the first best outcome in which information is acquired
if and only if its cost does not exceed k∗∗ and the action threshold is one-
half. In this section we ask whether this can be implemented by FOI. The
answer depends on which policy instruments the legislator can control.
Suppose the legislator can set not only the investigation cost but also all
of the punishment and reward parameters in the game between D and M.
11The indifference condition for D is a quadratic equation in π. For the values of z
considered in Proposition 2 only the smallest solution lies in [0, 1]. For the values in
Proposition 3 only the largest solution is relevant, while for intermediate values both
solutions are relevant.
22
Proposition 4, which follows directly from Proposition 5, gives the values of
(p, z, x, C) such that the game has a unique equilibrium which implements
the first best outcome. Figure 7 illustrates.
Proposition 4 First best solution
The first best outcome is achieved by setting the parameters as follows:
p∗ = b; z∗ = 1
2




)∗ ≡ C∗ < C0
With p∗ = b, θ1 is equal to the social optimum of one-half. Given that
z∗ = 1
2
this is a special case of Proposition 3 in which k1 is equal to the
first best value of information k∗∗. With C∗ < C0 and x∗ ≥ C0 the only
equilibrium is one in which information is acquired if and only if k ≤ k∗∗.
When acquired, information is fully disclosed and used according to the
socially optimal action rule.12 Note that although the conditions on C and
x are required for uniqueness, the first best exists for all C, x ≤ 1.
Fig. 7: First best outcome
In practice it is unlikely that the legislator can control all of the reward
and punishment parameters. In accordance with the theory of the second
best, when it is impossible to set all parameters at their first best levels
12For k > k∗∗ the observation of a = 1 without disclosure triggers an investigation
even though it is optimal that no information has been acquired. If this is regarded as
socially costly this can be avoided by setting x = 0 when k > k∗∗.
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implementing a rule that moves one parameter closer to its first best level
might be counterproductive. As Section 3.3 has demonstrated, when the
other parameters are not at their first best levels reducing C, by either re-
ducing c or increasing r, may have unintended consequences in aggravating
negligence and/or increasing bias.
Raising z, perhaps by introducing an information-gathering requirement
as part of the decision-making process with sizeable penalties for failure,13
may help in mitigating negligence: higher z increases kπ for any positive
π. This raises k1 in Figures 4, 5 and 6, and also kmin in Figure 6, in each
case expanding the region with full information acquisition at the expense
of regions with full or partial negligence.
The desirability of raising x, perhaps by introducing payments akin to
those paid to whistle-blowers, depends on the magnitude of z. When z
is small increasing x paradoxically increases negligence by expanding the
region with no information acquisition (see Figure 4). Intuitively, a larger
reward for uncovering negligence increases the incentive to investigate; if
the relative punishment for negligence is small, however, this lowers the
value of information. If z is suffi ciently large, by contrast, raising x shrinks
the region in which there is full or partial negligence (see Figure 5). Ac-
cordingly, it is desirable to increase x if and only if z is suffi ciently large.
Increasing p may reduce bias: in the equilibrium with minimum bias
θ1, larger p moves this threshold closer to the social optimum. However,
when z is small an increase in p may reduce k1, worsening negligence. This
can be seen by differentiating expression (3) with respect to p to obtain
dk1/dp = z − (b− p) /2. The first element, which is positive, stems from
increasing the absolute value of the punishment for negligence zp. The
second element, which is negative, is due to the greater discipline imposed
13For example, decision-making by industry regulators and antitrust authorities in
the U.K. has become more formalised than two decades ago, with the collection and
publication of considerable amounts of information now required as part of the process.
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on the use of information (via θ1) and the larger punishment for bias.
When the second effect dominates we are in Case 1 (discussed in Section
3.3.1); raising p modestly such that we remain in this case then lowers
k1, increasing negligence. Otherwise k1 increases with p: raising p then
becomes unambiguously beneficial, reducing both negligence and bias.
5 Applications
We describe three applications of our model, interpreting the players and
parameters in each setting and drawing out policy recommendations.
5.1 Media and political accountability
News media provide an important check on the behaviour of politicians,
holding government to account (for a survey of economics literature on me-
dia coverage and political accountability see Strömberg, 2015). Placing our
model in this context the players and payoffs can be interpreted as follows.
A politician (the decision-maker) takes an action that affects social welfare
and may benefit his private interests. A news outlet (the monitor) decides
whether or not to investigate. FOI provides easy access to information held
by the politician, reducing the cost of researching a story. Penalties and
rewards derive from the readership and impact of the story: the news out-
let makes a ‘scoop’which attracts additional readers, raising profits from
reader fees and/or advertising impacts, while the politician is punished by
negative publicity. As long as his career is not fatally damaged, the pun-
ishment is likely to be less than the private benefit (p < b), news stories
tending to pass quickly.
Punishments and rewards are usually higher for bias than for negligence
(x and z are small): bias is a more compelling news story while the diffi culty
of assessing what information could and should have been obtained makes
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negligence a harder story to convey. With small z the outcome resembles
Case 1, illustrated in Figure 4. Since x is also small the existence region
for the mixed equilibrium extends far to the left (panel 4a). Accordingly,
when k is in the same range as its value the introduction or strengthening
of FOI is likely to increase negligence; a large reduction in C may deter
information acquisition altogether. Assuming information is obtained, re-
ducing C might reduce bias– a reduction to just below C0 may shift the
equilibrium from the one with action threshold θ0 to one with partial or full
discipline– but this is not guaranteed. This analysis suggests that while
news media may be beneficial in reducing bias, the resulting incentives may
not generate the ideal monitoring system and in this context strengthening
FOI may increase politicians’tendency to avoid acquiring information that
might conflict with their preferred actions.
5.2 Discovery in court proceedings
Decisions of public bodies may be challenged in court, such as when a
regulatory decision is contested by affected companies or other stakehold-
ers. Pre-trial disclosure processes (‘discovery’) allow the plaintiff to request
evidence from the defendant, resulting in disclosure of all relevant informa-
tion. The players and payoffs in our model can be interpreted as follows.
An offi cial (the decision-maker) takes an action that affects social welfare
and may give him a private benefit. A plaintiff (the monitor), which may
be an affected firm, consumer organisation or lawyers bringing a class ac-
tion suit, decides whether to appeal the decision to an (unbiased) court.
As part of the appeal process, information held by the offi cial is disclosed:
more rigorous discovery rules reduce the plaintiff’s cost of pursuing an ap-
peal. If the offi cial is found to have taken a biased decision, punishments
and rewards occur in the form of fines imposed by the court and damages
and costs awarded to the plaintiff (where the latter represent transfers be-
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tween the parties). Assuming that a successful plaintiff fully recovers her
costs, r exceeds c and hence C < 1. The private benefit may well exceed
the punishment for bias: e.g. a planning decision may greatly benefit an
offi cial who receives a bribe or holds a stake in the land to be developed
while the penalty may be relatively small.
With information disclosure, bias may be proven in court. Negligence,
on the other hand, is harder to demonstrate. Even if the court determines
that the offi cial did not adequately inform himself before taking the deci-
sion, the relative punishment and reward for negligence (z, x) are likely to
be small: although costs might be awarded, fines and damages are unlikely
to be imposed. Thus the situation is likely to resemble Figure 4a of Case
1. Strengthening discovery to reduce C may then undermine information
acquisition, worsening the quality of decision-making. This analysis sug-
gests that the threat of court proceedings may need to be combined with
higher penalties (e.g. fines) for failure to underpin decisions with adequate
information. If such fines raise z suffi ciently the outcome will come under
Case 2; it could then be beneficial to strengthen discovery and/or increase
payments to the plaintiff in case of negligence so that C < x; otherwise,
such changes may be best avoided.
5.3 Product safety approval
Products such as pharmaceuticals require approval by a regulator (the
decision-maker) to ensure their safety and effectiveness before they may
be marketed or prescribed. The medical community (the monitor) plays
an important role in identifying and highlighting harmful side effects. Al-
though acting in the interests of social welfare, the regulator’s objective
function may be distorted by pressure to grant approval rapidly: for exam-
ple, Dr Frances Oldham Kelsey, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) physician who in 1960 reviewed Richardson-Merrell’s application to
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license thalidomide, was denounced by the manufacturer as a fussy, stub-
born, unreasonable bureaucrat for demanding further information on the
drug’s effects.14 When medical studies later revealed that thousands of
children had suffered severe birth defects from the drug, regulators in sev-
eral other countries were strongly criticised for failing to subject the drug
to suffi cient checks, resulting in financial compensation being sought from
those countries’governments as well as the drug’s manufacturers.
In the context of our model, the private benefit b from granting approval
(arising from either positive inducements or the absence of a negative pay-
off, −b, representing criticism such as that applied to Dr Kelsey) may ex-
ceed the punishments for bias and negligence. In this example, in contrast
to the previous two, the penalty for negligence may be fairly large, bringing
z close to 1. Rewards to medical professionals, whose motivation is to pro-
tect their patients, will be similar for negligence and bias, i.e. x is also close
to 1. With high z and x the equilibrium will be as represented in Figure 5b
of Case 2. For intermediate values of k, if C is initially high and the mixed
equilibrium is played a small reduction in C within the mixed strategy re-
gion worsens information acquisition, but a larger reduction which shifts
the equilibrium to one in which full information is acquired is beneficial.
6 Conclusion
The paper has considered the impact of freedom of information (FOI) rules
on the quality of decision-making in a setting where a decision-maker with
a private benefit from one action may acquire information prior to taking
the decision. We identify a ‘chilling effect’of FOI on information acqui-
sition by the decision-maker (or, equivalently, on effort put into analysing
14Dr Kelsey’s persistence largely spared the U.S. from the thalidomide tragedy. See
McFadden (2015) and Bernstein and Sullivan (2015).
28
information), increasing negligence, and a ‘discipline effect’on the use of
information, reducing the extent of bias in favour of the preferred action.
We find that strengthening FOI may increase negligence and, in some cases,
even increases bias. While increasing the punishment for negligence may
reduce its prevalence, raising the monitor’s reward for discovering it may
paradoxically increase negligence, if the associated punishment is too small.
Finally, we have interpreted our model in the context of the media and polit-
ical accountability, court proceedings and product safety approval, drawing
out lessons for institutional design.
Our model has a number of testable implications. With suitable mea-
sures of information acquisition, one could test directly the prediction that
the introduction or strengthening of FOI may reduce information acquisi-
tion prior to policy decisions: such measures might include the time taken
to consider the matter or the manpower devoted to the project (assuming
such data can be obtained from public bodies with the appropriate degree
of granularity). An alternative approach would be to test the variance
of policy outcomes and the accuracy of published preditions following the
introduction or strengthening of FOI: if information is not acquired, the
socially inferior action is taken in states where its negative impact on social
welfare is greater, thus the variability of policy outcomes will increase. In
addition, published predictions will be less informed, implying that their
accuracy is likely to decline.
While disclosure is not the main focus of discussion in the paper, the
model’s implications in this area might also be tested. In some parame-
ter regions strengthening FOI increases the likelihood that an informed
decision-maker discloses information voluntarily. Since, by definition, in-
formation disclosure is publicly observable, its occurrence and extent should
be relatively easy to measure. If information disclosure were found to in-
crease following the introduction or strengthening of FOI (without contem-
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poraneous strengthening of publication requirements) this would provide
evidence in support of the mechanisms highlighted in the paper.
Appendix: Full equilibrium characterisation
























Next, denote by s1 the measure of the set of types choosing a = 1 and
v = 0 in equilibrium, and by s1 the measure of the subset of s1 comprising
types θ < 1
2
.
Proposition 5 Full equilibrium characterisation
• An equilibrium in which γ = 0 exists for k ≥ kπ, with π = 1 if C < x,
π ∈ [0, 1] if C = x, and π = 0 if C > x. D chooses a = 1.
• An equilibrium in which γ = 1, π = 1, and D chooses v = 1 whenever
choosing a = 1 exists for k ≤ k1. The action threshold is θ1.
• An equilibrium in which γ = 1, π = 0, and some or no types choose
v = 1 when choosing a = 1 exists for k ≤ k0, C ≥ s1s1 ∈ [C0, 1]. The action
threshold is θ0.
• An equilibrium in which γ ∈ (0, 1), π = 1, and an informed D chooses
v = 1 whenever choosing a = 1 exists for k = k1 and C ≤ x. The action
threshold is θ1. If uninformed, D chooses a = 1.
• An equilibrium in which γ ∈ (0, 1), π = 0, and some or no types of
informed D choose v = 1 when choosing a = 1 exists for k = k0. The
following condition holds: C ≥ γs1+(1−γ)x
γs1+(1−γ) . The action threshold is θ0. If
uninformed, D chooses a = 1.
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• Equilibria in which γ ∈ (0, 1) , π ∈ (0, 1), informed types with θ ≥ 1
2
choose v = 1 and the remaining types choosing a = 1 choose v = 0 are
such that γ = 2(C−x)
2(C−x)+(b−πp)(1−C) . This equals zero for C = x, is increasing
in C and equal to one for C = 1. For z < b−p
2
, an equilibrium in this class




exists an equilibrium with π increasing in k for k ∈ (max {0, kmin} , k1)
and one with π decreasing in k for k ∈ (max {0, kmin} , k0). For z > b2 , an
equilibrium in this class exists for k ∈ (k0, k1) and π is increasing in k.
The action threshold in each case is θπ. If uninformed, D chooses a = 1.
• In all the equilibria with γ = 1 or γ ∈ (0, 1), either some or no types
who choose a = 0 choose v = 1, in which case π = 0, or all the types who
choose a = 0 choose v = 1, in which case π can take any value in [0, 1] .
In the equilibrium with γ = 0, π can take any value in [0, 1].
Proof.
Equilibria with γ = 0. In equilibrium, D chooses a = 1. Given M’s
equilibrium beliefs, π depends on the comparison of the expected cost c
and the expected reward xr. If C > x, then π = 0. If C < x, then π = 1.
If C = x, then π ∈ [0, 1]. A deviation to γ = 1 is undetectable by M un-
less D chooses a = 0. The value of π depends on M’s off-equilibrium path
beliefs following a = 0, and on the value of C. Nonetheless, for any π D’s
optimal action threshold after the deviation is θπ and the highest payoff
gain achievable by deviating to γ = 1 and using the optimal disclosure rule
described in Section 3.1 is kπ − k. Hence, we can conclude that equilibria
with γ = 0 exist iff k ≥ kπ.
Equilibria with γ = 1. Suppose that π = 1. All types taking a = 1
choose v = 1 to avoid the nuisance cost and D follows action threshold θ1.
M’s off-equilibrium path beliefs after observing a = 1, v = 0 must be such
that investigation is optimal for any cost. Notice that π = 1 minimises the
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payoff from a deviation to γ = 0, which is unprofitable if k ≤ k1.
Next suppose that π = 0. Types smaller than 1
2
choosing a = 1 do not dis-
close while types above 1
2
choosing a = 1 are indifferent towards disclosure.
Therefore D follows action threshold θ0. Since the value of information for
π = 0 is k0, deviation to γ = 0 is unprofitable iff k ≤ k0. For M, π = 0
is compatible with equilibrium iff C ≥ s1
s1
, the equilibrium probability that
investigation after a = 1 results in a reward. As the proportion of types
θ ≥ 1
2
that do not disclose converges to 1, s1
s1
converges to C0 ≡ b1+b ; as the
same proportion converges to 0, s1
s1
converges to 1.
Finally, to prove that there are no equilibria with γ = 1 and π ∈ (0, 1),
notice that in such an equilibrium all types θ ≥ 1
2
choosing a = 1 would
disclose, while all types θ < 1
2
choosing a = 1 would not disclose. The ac-
tion threshold would be θπ. Given equilibrium beliefs, M would then have
an incentive to deviate to π = 1.
Equilibria with γ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that π = 1. All informed types choos-
ing a = 1 disclose θ to save ε and D follows action threshold θ1. Under
equilibrium beliefs M attributes a = 1, v = 0 to an uninformed decision-
maker, hence π = 1 is optimal for her iff C ≤ x. The value of information
is k1, hence D is indifferent between γ = 0 and γ = 1 iff k = k1.
Next suppose that π = 0. Types smaller than 1
2
choosing a = 1 do not
disclose, while types above 1
2
choosing a = 1 are indifferent between dis-
closing or not. Therefore, D follows action threshold θ0. Since the value
of information for π = 0 is k0, D is indifferent between γ = 0 and γ = 1
iff k = k0. Given M’s equilibrium beliefs, the condition for π = 0 to be
optimal is that C ≥ γs1+(1−γ)x
γs1+(1−γ) , where the exact values of s1 and s1 de-






















+(1−γ) . Notice that
γs1+(1−γ)x





for γ = 1.
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Finally, suppose that π ∈ (0, 1). Types smaller than 1
2
choosing a = 1 do
not disclose, while types above 1
2
choosing a = 1 disclose. Therefore D
follows action threshold θπ. After observing a = 1, v = 0, M, who holds




. Therefore M is indifferent between investigating and






+(1−γ) , i.e. iff γ =
2(C−x)
2(C−x)+(b−πp)(1−C) . This
probability is equal to zero for C = x. Given x < 1, γ is increasing in C
and equal to one for C = 1.
The investigation probability π is determined by the indifference condi-
tion for D at the information acquisition stage: k = kπ, which gives the





(b− 2z) π + k0 − k = 0. (4)




. Notice that real roots
exist only for k ≥ kmin ≡ k0− (b−2z)
2
4
: the cost of information can be equal
to its value only if it is larger than the minimum value. Let πH (k) denote
the larger root and πL (k) denote the smaller root. There are three cases
to consider.
Case (a): z ≤ b−p
2
. In this region kπ is strictly decreasing in π for π ∈ [0, 1]
. We can eliminate the larger root of (4) because it is larger than one.
Therefore the equilibrium probability of investigation is πL (k), which is
decreasing in k, equal to zero at k0 and unity at k1.







. In this region, kmin ≤ min {k0, k1} and k1 > k0 iff
z > 2b−p
4
. πL (k) is decreasing in k; it takes value zero at k = k0 and its
maximum value is b−2z
p
for k = kmin. πH (k) is instead increasing in k; its
minimum value is b−2z
p
for k = kmin and it achieves value one for k = k1.







, there are two mixed strategy equilibria.
The first one exists only for k ∈ (max {0, kmin} , k0) and has probability of
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investigation πL (k). The second one exists only for k ∈ (max {0, kmin} , k1)
and has probability of investigation πH (k).
Case (c): z ≥ b
2
. In this region kπ is strictly increasing in π for π ∈ [0, 1]
.The smaller root πL (k) is strictly negative. Hence, the equilibrium prob-
ability of investigation after a = 1, v = 0 is πH (k), which is increasing in
k, equal to zero at k0 and unity at k1.
Value of π. The only equilibria where a = v = 0 is observed by M on
equilibrium path are those with γ > 0 and partial disclosure by informed
types smaller than θπ. These types are taking the socially optimal action,
hence the best response is π = 0. In turn, π = 0 makes these types indif-
ferent between disclosing and not disclosing. In equilibria where a = v = 0
is observed only off equilibrium path, any value of π can be sustained by
appropriate off-equilibrium path beliefs.
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